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According to presentism, everything that exists is present. According to the 
truthmaker principle, for every true proposition there is a truthmaker – an entity 
that suffices for the truth of that proposition. According to realism about the past, 
there are true propositions about the past. Together these claims necessitate 
presently existing truthmakers for truths about the past (presentist truthmakers). 
 
Cameron (2010) argues that temporal distributional properties (TDPs) can play the 
role of presentist truthmakers. Corkum (2014) argues that they cannot. I argue 
against Corkum’s objections. In §2, I introduce, and outline the motivation for, 
TDPs. In §3, I show that unless TDPs are stipulated to be fundamental, as Cameron 
does, they can be reduced to temporal non–distributional properties, which are 
unable to play the role of presentist truthmakers. In §4, I argue against Corkum’s 
two objections to Cameron’s stipulation. Corkum’s first objection is that Cameron 
has no grounds on which to stipulate that TDPs are fundamental, and that the 
reducibility of TDPs to temporal non–distributional properties (as discussed in §3) 
shows that they are not. I argue that the burden of proof is not on Cameron to argue 
that TDPs are fundamental, but on Corkum to argue that they are not, and that to 
argue from the reducibility of TDPs to their non–fundamentality is to beg the 
question against Cameron: the reduction is only possible once their non–
fundamentality is assumed. Corkum’s second objection is that if Cameron is allowed 
to stipulate that TDPs are fundamental in order to escape objections, then a superior 
alternative account is allowed to make the same move, rendering Cameron’s account 
redundant. I argue that the cases are asymmetric: the alternative account faces a 




According to presentism, everything that exists is present. According to the truthmaker 
principle, for every true proposition there is a truthmaker – an entity that suffices for 
the truth of that proposition. According to realism about the past, there are true 
propositions about the past. Together these claims necessitate presently existing 
truthmakers for truths about the past (presentist truthmakers). Cameron (2010) argues 
that temporal distributional properties can play the role of presentist truthmakers. 
Corkum (2014) argues that they cannot. 
 
In this essay, I argue against Corkum’s objections. In §2, I introduce, and outline the 
motivation for, temporal distributional properties. In §3, I show that unless temporal 
distributional properties are stipulated to be fundamental, as Cameron does, they can 
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be reduced to temporal non–distributional properties, which are unable to play the role 
of presentist truthmakers. In §4, I argue against Corkum’s two objections to Cameron’s 
stipulation. Corkum’s first objection is that Cameron has no grounds on which to 
stipulate that temporal distributional properties are fundamental, and that the 
reducibility of temporal distributional properties to temporal non–distributional 
properties (as discussed in §3) shows that they are not. I argue that the burden of proof 
is not on Cameron to argue that temporal distributional properties are fundamental, 
but on Corkum to argue that they are not, and that to argue from the reducibility of 
temporal distributional properties to their non–fundamentality is to beg the question 
against Cameron: the reduction is only possible once their non–fundamentality is 
assumed. Corkum’s second objection is that if Cameron is allowed to stipulate that 
temporal distributional properties are fundamental in order to escape objections, then 
a superior alternative account is allowed to make the same move, rendering Cameron’s 
account redundant. I argue that the cases are asymmetric: the alternative account faces 
a legitimate objection whilst Cameron’s account does not. 
 
2 Intrinsic Determination and Temporal Distributional 
Properties 
 
One attempt at providing the presentist with a truthmaker for past truths is Bigelow’s 
(1996) account of Lucretian properties – presently existing tensed properties 
instantiated by the world. Under Bigelow’s account, for example, ‘dinosaurs once 
existed’ is made true by a presently existing tensed Lucretian property instantiated by 
the world – something like <being such so as to have contained dinosaurs>. 
 
Sider (2001) charges Lucretian properties with ontological cheating, by which he means 
two things: they are hypothetical (they ‘point–beyond’ their bearers) and they are not 
categorical (they do not ‘point–at’ their bearers). To quote Sider (2001, 41), “[w]hether 
the world has the property previously containing dinosaurs is not a matter of what the 
world itself is like, but points beyond itself, to the past.” Cameron (2010) takes these 
charges to amount to the claim that Lucretian properties tell us nothing about the 
intrinsic nature of their bearers in the present, and proposes to admit only difference–
making properties – properties that make a difference to a bearer’s intrinsic nature – 
into our ontology, sifting out unwanted non–difference–making properties with the 
criterion of intrinsic determination:  
 
for all objects x and properties F and times t, if x instantiates F at t, then 
x has the intrinsic nature at t that it has partly in virtue of instantiating 
F at t.  
(Cameron, 2010, 5) 
 
Bigelow’s properties do not satisfy intrinsic determination: the world does not have its 
present intrinsic nature (even partly) in virtue of instantiating the property <being such 
as to have contained dinosaurs> (another world could have a different history to our own 
and thus fail to instantiate this property, yet nonetheless be identical to our own world 
in terms of its present intrinsic properties). So, Lucretian properties cannot serve as 
presentist truthmakers.  
 
Cameron’s claim is that temporal distributional properties do the job of providing for 
presentist truthmakers. A distributional property is the way that something is across a 
region: a spatial distributional property is the way that something is across space; a 
temporal distributional property is the way that something is across time. As Josh 
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Parsons (2004, 1) puts it, “a distributional property is like a way of painting, or filling 
in, a spatially [or temporally] extended object with some property”. For example, 
‘dinosaurs once existed’ is made true by a presently existing temporal distributional 
property instantiated by the world, which details how the world has been at every 
instant in time – something like <being like x, then like y>2, where x maximally describes 
the world at some instant of time in which it contained dinosaurs. It is important to 
note that it is not just one part of the property, the <being like x> part, that serves as 
the truthmaker for ‘dinosaurs once existed’. Temporal distributional properties (and 
properties more generally) do not have parts. It is the property as a whole which serves 
as the truthmaker, which is not divided but spread across its bearer.3  
 
Temporal distributional properties satisfy intrinsic determination: the world does have 
its present intrinsic nature in virtue of instantiating <being like x, then like y>, where y 
maximally describes the world right now, so they are difference making. Again, this is 
the case not because <being like y> is a part of <being like x, then like y>, but because 
of the latter property as a whole. All else being well, then, temporal distributional 
properties seem fit to serve as presentist truthmakers. 
 
 
3 The Reducibility of Temporal Distributional Properties 
 
The reductionist about distributional properties thinks that distributional properties 
like<being polka–dotted red on white> can be reduced to non–distributional properties 
like <being an x such that there are some ys, and the ys are part of x, and the ys are of 
the right sorts of colour, and the ys are spatially related in the right sorts of ways>.4 
Parsons (2004) objects to the possibility of such a reduction by pointing out that non–
idealised (i.e., real world) instances of polka–dots will have a non-uniform colour 
distribution that cannot be reduced to a non–distributional colour property. No non–
idealised polka dot will be uniformly red, and that heterogeneity will make it impossible 
to characterise it as a y of the right sort of colour. Moreover, the reductionist has to 
contend with gradients of colour, from red to blue, say, and here again there will be no 
ys that are the right sort of colour, for any extended y will be a gradient of some colour 
to another between red and blue (perhaps some very closely related purples). 
 
To avoid this problem, the reductionist must substitute polka–dots for extensionless 
points which can bear neither non–uniform colour distributions nor, more generally, 
distributional properties. Parsons puts it like this: 
 
[W]hen, and only when, red and white point–sized objects [i.e., the smallest 
spatial parts of the property bearer] are spatially arranged in the right way, 
you get something polka–dotted red on white. [Then] [<being polka–dotted 
red on white>] is equivalent to a non–distributional property specifying the 
arrangement of such points, and the same sort of story will work for any 
other distributional property.  
(Parsons, 2004, 5) 
 
If the reduction is to be warranted in general then this must be possible in every case, 
and so every extended object must consist of extensionless points (for if it didn’t there 
would be room for distributional properties). This places a restriction on the reductionist 
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that she cannot meet: given the possibility of gunk (whereby there are no points, that 
is, space is infinitely divisible) or spatially extended simples (whereby a partless object 
occupies two points or more, that is, exists (simpliciter) at more than one point), there 
is room for an extended object with no extensionless parts and so room for a spatial 
distributional property that will not reduce (Parsons, 2004, 6-8). That gives us reason 
to rule out the equivalence of the two kinds of property, and so reason to rule out the 
reduction. 
 
The same argument against reduction does not hold for temporal distributional 
properties; at least not for presentists. Consider the temporal distributional property 
<being like x, then like y>. Just as the property <being polka–dotted red on white> is 
distributed across its spatially extended bearer, so too the property <being like x, then 
like y> is distributed across its temporally extended bearer, the world. To paraphrase 
Parsons: 
 
[W]hen, and only when, x–like and y–like instance–sized objects [i.e., the 
smallest temporal parts of the property bearer] are temporally arranged 
in the right way, you get something x–like then y–like. Then <being like x, 
then like y> is equivalent to a non–distributional property specifying the 
arrangement of such instants, and the same sort of story will work for 
any other temporal distributional property. 
 
If the reduction is to be warranted in general then this must be possible in every case, 
and so every temporally extended object must consist of extensionless instants. This 
places a restriction on the reductionist that she can meet, but only if she’s a presentist. 
Given presentism there is no possibility of temporal gunk. If there were, then any time 
which is present would be divided into smaller parts, all of which would then be present. 
But the present exists only at an instant. So, there is no temporal gunk. There is also 
no possibility of temporally extended simples. If there were, then they would exist 
(simpliciter) at more than one time. But, according to presentism, everything that exists 
exists in the present, and as we have just seen, the present cannot occupy more than 
one time. So, there are no extended simples. Thus, there is no room for an extended 
object with no extensionless temporal parts, and so no room for a temporal 
distributional property that will not reduce. That demonstrates the equivalence of the 
two kinds of property, and that warrants the reduction. 
 
As such, there is (yet) no principled metaphysical reason why temporal distributional 
properties cannot be reduced to conjunctive non–distributional properties. Let’s call this 
the reduction observation. This is of potential concern to Cameron, since conjunctive 
non–distributional properties reduced from temporal distributional properties have 
parts that are wholly past–facing. For example, the temporal distributional property 
<being like x, then like y> is reduced to a conjunctive non–distributional property, the 
<being like x>) conjunct of which is wholly past–facing, and which thus fails to satisfy 
intrinsic determination, ruling it out as a legitimate property, and ruling it out as a 
presentist truthmaker. 
 
Cameron’s reply is to block the reduction by stipulating that temporal distributional 
properties are fundamental: 
 
It’s true that for any temporal distributional property, there’s a very 
complex big conjunctive property made up of the objectionable past-
directed properties and unobjectionable present-directed properties [the] 
instantiation of which would have exactly the same effect as the 
distributional property. In that sense, they’re equivalent. But the 
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temporal distributional property is fundamental, whereas the conjunctive 
property is not. [...] Distributional properties cannot be broken up into 
simpler components: there is just one property here, and it is 
fundamental – and it is exactly the same property that is grounding truths 
about how the bearer now is that is grounding truths about how the 
bearer was. 
(Cameron, 2010, 11) 
 
Since temporal distributional properties are stipulated to be fundamental, they cannot 
be reduced to non–distributional properties, leaving it open to the presentist to employ 
them as truthmakers. 
 
4 The Fundamentality of Temporal Distributional Properties 
 
Corkum’s claim is that Cameron’s stipulation of the fundamentality of temporal 
distributional properties is illegitimate. His first objection has two parts: first, that 
Cameron has no grounds on which to stipulate that temporal distributional properties 
are fundamental, and second, that the reduction observation is evidence that they are 
not.  
 
On what grounds can the distributionalist make this stipulation? It can 
be difficult to adjudicate on such matters. One philosopher’s bold 
conjecture is another’s undefended assumption. However, in this case the 
onus is clearly on the distributionalist to defend the stipulation. Some of 
our examples of temporally distributed properties appear to be 
conjunctive properties and so prima facie not irreducible. For example, 
the property of having been a child and being now an adult appears to be 
explicable in terms of the properties of being a child and being an adult, 
along with a temporal arrangement of these properties  
(Corkum, 2014, 5) 
 
With regard to the first part, Cameron’s reply is that the proponent of a theory is 
permitted to stipulate anything they want. 5  Of course, once something has been 
stipulated it can be objected to (the objection can hardly be made prior to that which is 
being objected to), but then the burden of proof lies with the opponent. Sider (2006, 81-
82) makes the point that the proponent of a thesis is under no obligation to convert his 
opponent to his way of thinking, and is required only to resist her attacks. That applies 
here: it is perfectly legitimate for Cameron to stipulate that temporal distributional 
properties are fundamental, and if his opponent doesn’t think that they are 
fundamental, then the burden of proof is on her to demonstrate why. 
 
With regard to the second part, I take Corkum to be saying that even if it were legitimate 
for Cameron to initially stipulate the irreducibility of temporal distributional properties 
without any evidence for their fundamentality, this changes when charges are bought 
against it. The reduction observation is evidence against the fundamentality of 
Cameron’s property, and the burden of proof is now on Cameron to provide evidence for 
their irreducibility, which he cannot. 
 
But that’s not quite right. The initial stipulation of fundamentality blocks that reduction. 
As Sider pointed out, Cameron is under no obligation to convert Corkum, and Cameron 
is under no obligation to provide evidence for the fundamentality of his properties. His 
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intellectual obligation in the face of Corkum’s objections is not to provide arguments for 
the thesis that temporal distributional properties are fundamental, but rather to provide 
arguments against those objections – against the reductionist thesis that they are 
explicable in terms of non–distributional properties appropriately arranged. And this he 
has done by stipulating their fundamentality: temporal distributional properties are not 
explicable in terms of non–distributional properties because the latter have parts that 
are wholly past–facing and as such fail to satisfy intrinsic determination, and the former 
do not. You can’t explain one thing in terms of another thing when they’re demonstrably 
inequivalent. 
 
So far, then, I’ve argued that it is legitimate for Cameron to stipulate the fundamentality 
of temporal distributional properties, and that, once stipulated as such, the reduction 
observation does not constitute an objection against their fundamentality. 
 
Corkum’s second objection is that if it is legitimate for Cameron to stipulate that 
temporal distributional properties are fundamental, then it is legitimate for proponents 
of Lucretian properties to stipulate that Lucretian properties satisfy intrinsic 
determination. If this is true, then either (i) if the consequent is false, then the 
antecedent is false by modus tollens, or (ii) if the consequent is true, then there is no 
need for Cameron’s properties, so his stipulation of their fundamentality is self–
defeating.6 
 
I take Corkum’s reasoning to be as follows. The reduction observation gives us reason 
to believe that temporal distributional properties reduce to non–distributional 
properties, and if that is the case, then they can’t do the work that presentists require 
of them. In response, Cameron just stipulates that they don’t reduce, and the problem 
goes away. Analogously, there is reason to believe (see §1) that Lucretian properties do 
not satisfy intrinsic determination, and if that is the case, then they can’t do the work 
that presentists require of them. So in response, why can’t Bigelow just stipulate that 
they do satisfy intrinsic determination, and let the problem go away? If Cameron can do 
it, why can’t the proponent of Lucretian properties? 
 
To this, Corkum anticipates the following response: 
 
The distributionalist may respond that there is a salient difference 
between the two cases. In the one case, Lucretian properties are 
stipulated as making an intrinsic difference in the world; in the other 
case, temporal distributional properties are stipulated to be irreducible. 
(Corkum, 2014, 28) 
 
Corkum is right that the distributionalist will respond by pointing out a salient 
difference in the cases, but he misidentifies what that salient difference is. What is being 
stipulated is irrelevant. What’s relevant is that whilst there is an argument forwarded 
for the thesis that Lucretian properties do not satisfy intrinsic determination, there is 
no argument forwarded for the thesis that temporal distributional properties are not 
fundamental. The salient difference is that there are arguments against the satisfaction 
of intrinsic determination by Lucretian properties where there are none against the 
fundamentality of temporal distributional properties. One might think that the 
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reduction observation counts as just such an objection, but that objection would beg 
the question: the reduction only goes through if temporal distributional properties are 
non–fundamental, and to assume that they are in order to prove that they are is question 
begging.  
 
Why is this the salient difference? Well, assume that in the formulation of their 
respective theses, the proponent of Lucretian properties stipulates that they satisfy 
intrinsic determination, and the proponent of temporal distributional properties 
stipulates that they are fundamental. Now assume that an objection is given to each 
property. Clearly, in both cases, reiterating the initial stipulation is not enough, as it is 
still subject to the objection raised. What is required is a defence of the stipulation 
against the attack. In actuality, just such an objection has been raised for the proponent 
of Lucretian properties, and it is obviously not enough just to reiterate the claim that is 
under attack. No such objection has been raised for Cameron, so his initial stipulation 
remains unsullied. Put another way, the salient difference is this: Cameron’s stipulation 
is a legitimate initial formulation; Corkam’s proposed stipulation is an illegitimate 




Cameron’s claim is that temporal distributional properties are truthmakers, which, if 
true, resolves the trilemma between presentism, truthmaker theory, and past truths. 
To do so he needs to stipulate that they are fundamental, which Corkum objects to. I 
have argued that Corkum’s first objection fails because (i) it is legitimate for Cameron 
to stipulate their fundamentality, and (ii) given that stipulation, the reduction 
observation fails as an objection to their fundamentality. I have also argued that 
Corkum’s second objection fails because, whilst there is an objection made against the 
satisfation of intrinsic determination by Lucretian properties, there is no objection 
made against the fundamentality of temporal distributional properties. Of course, 
whether or not we are justified in believing that temporal distributional properties are 
truthmakers under presentism depends, in part, on whether or not we are justified in 
believing that they are fundamental. My claim here is not that they are, but that 
Corkum’s argument that they are not is unsuccessful. It remains to be seen whether 





Bigelow, John. ‘‘Presentism and Properties.’’ Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996): 35-52. 
Cameron, Ross. ‘‘Truthmaking for Presentists.’’ Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 6 (2010): 55-100. 
(page numbers from: http://myweb.facstaff.wwu.edu/wasserr/bspc/underground/Cameron.pdf). 
Corkum, Phil. ‘‘Presentism, Truthmakers, and Distributional Properties.’’ Synthese 191 (2014): 
3427-46. (page numbers from: http://www.ualberta.ca/ pcorkum/presentism.pdf). 
Parsons, Josh. ‘Distributional Properties’, in Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, 
edited by Frank Jackson, and Graham Priest, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
Sider, Theodore. Four–Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2001. 
Sider, Theodore.‘‘Quantifiers and Temporal Ontology.’’ Mind 115 (2006): 75-97. 
